



THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CASES OF INSANITY.
We have read, with some degree of interest, and a sincere
desire to arrive at truth, the article in the April number of
THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, entitled " The burden of proof
in cases of Insanity," and believing that some of the conclu-
sions arrived at by the author are not sustained by reason, or
by any considerable number of adjudications, we propose
briefly to notice the question as it presents itself to us.
The author inquires: "Is the burden of proof-the onus
piobandi-anything more or anything less than the duty of
proving any fact substantially in issue ? And is not that duty
always upon the party who substantially asserts the affirmative
of the issue ?" We think the question is pretty fairly stated,
yet so stated as in some degree to lead the mind from the prin-
ciple generally understood to be correct by legal writers, and
those who have treated of the science of rhetoric.
Writers on rhetoric say the affirmative of every issue is
to be proved, but they further say, that it is unnecessary to
prove a fact, that may be fairly presumed, or taken for
granted, until disproved.
The law deals largely in presumptions, and it is right that
it should. A person, though charged by indictment with the
commission of crime, is presumed to be innocent. No prac.
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titioner, who was thorough in his profession, would ever sup-
pose it-necessary to sustain the veracity of his witness before
his character for truth had been in some way questioned or
impeached, because thelaw presumes that every witness speaks
the truth, and the advocate who would attempt to bolster the
reputation of a witness before it was assailed would greatly
weaken his cause.
Every man is presumed to be sane, because sanity is the
normal condition of the intellect, and we maintain that under
the effect of such presumption, he who would avoid responsi-
bility for an act amounting to an infraction of law, on the plea
that he was insane, and hence not responsible, takes upon him-
self the burden of proving that condition of his mind.
A lucid writer on rhetoric, in treating of this question-
"Onus probandi," says: "In the interpretation of this princi-
ple, it should be borne in mind that the stress is to be laid on
the fact of alleging or affirming, not on the form of the propo-
sition itself, as affirmative or negative. The principle is he
who alleges must prove. If the allegation be in the negative
form, it does not shift the burden of proof. The fundamental
ground, on which the principle rests is, that whatever is new
shall be accounted for. He who makes an allegation puts into
being a statement that did not exist before. He is properly
called upon to account for it, prove it, and thus make it a
truth."
In legal investigations the burden of proof is upon him
"who alleges the affirmative of a proposition," and "in gene-
ral, whenever the law presumes the affirmative, it lies on the
party who denies the fact to prove the negative."
This principle is asserted by Starkie, Philips, Roscoe, Bal-
wer, Bouvier and many other authors, including the Justices
of the Supreme Courts of most of the States of the Union.
With the few cases where a different principle seems to have
been asserted, some peculiar circumstances were doubtless con-
.pected, which indicated to the minds of the courts the pro-
priety, not of departing from long-settled principles, but of par-
tially relaxing the rules regulating their enforcement, that
the persons on trial might the more effectually obtain the hene-
IN CASES OF INSANITY.
fit of those circumstances which could not have been obtained
by a rigid adherence to the letter of the rules.
We do not understand that the courts have, by their rulings,
abrogated the principle that the plea of insanity is ordinarily,
and generally, but an allegation of matter in defense, and
that as such it must, in order to be available, be so sus-
tained by affirmative proof as to create a reasonable doubt of
guilt.
The trial of a person indicted for murder is regulated by
rules of evidence as old as the common law of England, and
we refer to the ordinary progress of such trial to illustrate
our views.
Two well established principles of presumption enter into
the case. 1st. The prisoner is presumed to be innocent. 2d.
He is presumed to be sane; the latter resulting from the fact
that he is a man, of whom rationality is an essential attribute;
To sustain the prosecution the homicide is proved, and when
the facts necessary to constitute the crime are sufficiently
proved to warrant a conviction, in the absence of other proof
the prosecution may safely rest the case. A case is then made
out against the accused, and if, to procure an acquittal, he
lies on insanity, he assumes, as to that matter, the burden of
proof. He then makes insanity the issue, because it is an alle-
gation of fact in opposition to a presumption of law.
After the government has sustained the indictment, evi-
dence to excuse, justify, reduce, or extenuate, must be offered
by the defense.
If the defense be, that the killing, though unlawful, was not
in malice, but the result of sudden passion, and such defense be
sustained, the crime will be reduced to manslaughter. If, that
it was in the necessary self-defense of the accused, the effort
will be to prove that he was attacked by his assailant, and in
the exercise of sound judgment and discretion was justified in
taking the life of his antagonist.-I" Defendendo."-These
defenses must be made out by the evidence upon the entire
case, in order that they be available. If the excuse, or extenu
ation, rests upon the allegation that the prisoner was insane,
and hence not competent to form a wicked motive, or entertain
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a malicious purpose, he must, as we understand the principle,
make the allegation direct; and, in order that the plea avail
him, so far sustain it by proof as to create in the minds of the
jurors at least a reasonable doubt of sanity-one of the neces-
sary ingredients in crime-and, in consequence of such doubt,
obtain a verdict of acquittal.
.Generally, a defense based on insanity is only intended to
bring the prisoner within the principles of reasonable doubt,
and no greater latitude should be given a defense of that char-
acter, unless the accused is either a confirmed idiot or lunatic.
It is not pretended by writers on criminal or medical juris-
prudenee that even the monomaniac is insane, to the extent
of destroying his legal accountability. The subject of monw-
mania is little understood, and hence difficult to treat on
philosophic principles. By reason of these difficulties the
subject is approached with diffidence, and the courts, when the
question is involved, administer the law with caution. No
other course would be safe, and in the exercise of such cau-
tion, persons relying on insanity generally get the benefit of
it, in the form of a reasonable dbubt.
We maintain that the government does not, in criminal
prosecutions, by affirming the guilt of the accused, undertake
to prove his sanity, because it is never necessary to prove
what the law presumes.
The prisoner is not required to prove his innocence, because
the law presumes it; and if the prosecution fails to prove his
guilt, he may rest content, and demand acquittal, upon failure
of proof against him. By parity of reasoning, it is wholly
unnecessary for the government to prove the sanity of the
accused, and if insanity is alleged-affirmed-by him, he
thereupon undertakes to sustain it.
The allegation of insanity is as much an affirmative propo-
sition as is that of sanity, and in view of the fact that sanity
is the normal condition of the intellect, we think more so.
We allege-affirm-that a man is sane, or we allege-affirm
-that he is insane. The strength of the affirmation is the
same in both instances, so far as language is concerned. In
the former, however, we only affirm what the law presumes,
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and hence the affirmation need not be proved. Ordinarily,
it is useless and simply idle; but in the latter instance we
must make oar affirmation good. because it asserts the exist-
ence of a fact, in opposition to a presumption of law. It is
not idle or senseless, but is real, is of substance, and to be of
value must be sustained by proof.
We can conceive of but one state of case in which sanity
should be affirmed and proved by the prosecution. Ifa person
who had been, by virtue of a writ, "de lunatico inquirendo,"
found and declared a lunatic, and should afterward commit an
act which would amount to a crime, if committed by a sane
person, we apprehend it would be proper, on the trial of such
person, for the government to prove that the act was committed
during a lucid interval, or that since the judgment of lunacy
a like inquest had found his mind to have been restored.
A last will, in order to be valid, must have been executed by
a person who, at the time, was of sound mind and disposing
memory; and it is customary in probating wills to ask the
subscribing witnesses, in relation to the capacity of the testa-
tor, when the will was executed. The law requires it, yet
every practitioner knows, that unless there is a contest in
relation to the testator's capacity, such inquiries are merely
formal. If there should be a real contest of that character, the
issue will be made by a direct allegation of incapacity, on the
part of the testator, which the contestants will undertake
affirmatively to pirove. Wills are most generally executed
shortly before dissolution, when the intellectual, as well as
the physical system, has been weakened by disease, and when
a few moments of time will often suffice to change the con-
dition of the patient from a state of sanity to one of com-
plete mental imbecility. Hence the propriety of the custom
and law, requiring inquiry as to the condition of the testa-
tor's mind, at the particular time of executing his will. It
is, however, never understood that such inquiries ale mtendea
to question the sanity of one who may, when in good health.
and the full exercise of his faculties, mental and physical
lave executed a will, by not merely dictating, but in fact
writing, scaling and publishing it.
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A class of cases is becoming common where the plea of
insanity-is interposed, and most generally with success. The
reader will fully understand to what we allude, and we will
not therefore detail the disgusting scenes, often witnessed in
courts of justice, upon the trial of those who claim that their
honor has been wounded, or their domestic felicity and hap-
piness destroyed.
The law, to be worth anything, must be consistent, and if it
should become the settled principle that the government, in
criminal prosecutions, must prove sanity, whether it be denied
or not, the presumption of sanity in such cases-now a promi-
nent principle of jurisprudence-oughtto be abrogated. Do
this, and we necessarily assert the counter principle, that he
who commits an act which would, in its facts and details, if
committed by a sane person, amount to a crime, must be pre-
sumed to be insane at the time of the commission of the act.
To be further consistent, we must say that any wrong, criminal
or civil, is the result of insanity, general or special, on the part
of the actor. Hence, he ought not to be punished as a wrong-
doer, or held morally responsible, or even legally so, except in
being required to restore property, taken by him-not stolen-
because he was insane, and could not have a criminal motive.
In the great forum of human conscience, and in view of
human accountability to society, to the tribunals of this
world, and to that of the world to come, such principles ought
not to be permitted to prevail, unless it should be determined
that all moral dereliction is the result of insanity; in which
event, to be still further consistent, it would become neces-
sary to inaugurate a stupendous system of reform schools
and asylnms, in which to restrain and reform the millions of
lunatics with which the world abounds.
We think it is for the present, at least, safe to abide the
old landmarks requiring the government to make out her case
according to established usage; and if a supposed criinal, or
his attorney, feels that his defense requires the interposition
of a plea of insanity, let the allegation be made affirmatively,
and the accused receive the benefit of it, according as tho
proof may justify. w. R I
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